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What caused the financial crisis? What prolonged it?  Why did it worsen so dramatically 
more than a year after it began?  Rarely in economics is there a single answer to such questions, 
but the empirical research I present in this paper strongly suggests that specific government 
actions and interventions should be first on the list of answers to all three. I focus on the period 
from the start of the crisis through October 2008 when market conditions deteriorated 
precipitously and rapidly. I draw on research papers, speeches at central banks, and 
congressional testimony I have given on the crisis during the past two years.
1  
This paper is based on the keynote lecture delivered in Ottawa on November 14 at a 
conference in honor of David Dodge, former Governor of the Bank of Canada.  Following an 
approach to policy advocated by David Dodge throughout his distinguished career in public 
service, I try to use empirical evidence to the maximum extent possible and explain the analysis 
in the simplest possible terms, including by using a series of illustrative graphs. 
 
1. What Caused the Financial Crisis? 
The classic explanation of financial crises, going back hundreds of years, is that they are 
caused by excesses—frequently monetary excesses—which lead to a boom and an inevitable 
bust. In the recent crisis we had a housing boom and bust which in turn led to financial turmoil in 
                                                 
1 I refer to this research in this paper using the bracketed numbers in the section “Summary of Research Projects” at 
the end of the paper.  
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the United States and other countries. I begin by showing that monetary excesses were the main 
cause of that boom and the resulting bust.   
 
1.1 Loose Fitting Monetary Policy 
Figure 1 was published in The Economist magazine in October 2007 as a simple way to 
illustrate the story of monetary excesses.  The figure is based on a paper [1] that I presented at 
the annual Jackson Hole conference in August 2007.  It examines Federal Reserve policy 
decisions—in terms of the federal funds interest rate—from 2000 to 2006.   
The line that dips down to one percent in 2003, stays there into 2004, and then rises 
steadily until 2006 shows the actual interest rate decisions of the Federal Reserve.  The other line 
shows what the interest rate would have been if the Fed had followed the type of policy that it 
had followed fairly regularly during the previous 20 year period of good economic performance. 
The Economist labels that line the Taylor rule because it is a smoothed version of the interest rate 
one gets by plugging actual inflation and GDP into a policy rule that I proposed in 1992.
2  But 
the important point is that this line shows what the interest rate would have been if the Fed had 
followed the kind of policy that had worked well during the historical experience of the Great 
Moderation that began in the early 1980s. 
                                                 
2 When he was President of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, William Poole presented a similar chart covering 
a longer period and without the smoothing in “Understanding the Fed,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Review, 
January/February, 2007, Vol. 89. No. 1, pp. 3-14  
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        Figure 1. Chart from The Economist, October 18, 2007 
 
Figure 1 shows that the actual interest rate decisions fell well below what historical experience 
would suggest policy should be.  It thus provides an empirical measure that monetary policy was 
too easy during this period, or too “loose fitting” as The Economist puts it.  This was an 
unusually big deviation from the Taylor rule. There was no greater or more persistent deviation 
of actual Fed policy since the turbulent days of the 1970s.  So there is clearly evidence that there 
were monetary excesses during the period leading up to the housing boom.   
The unusually low interest rates decisions were, of course, made with careful 
consideration by monetary policymakers.  One can interpret them as purposeful deviations from 
the “regular” interest rate settings based on the usual macroeconomic variables.  The Fed used 
transparent language to describe the decisions, saying, for example, that interest rates would be 
low for “a considerable period” and that they would rise slowly at a “measured pace,” which 
were ways of clarifying that the decisions were deviations from the rule in some sense.  These 
actions were thus effectively discretionary government interventions in that they deviated from  
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the regular way of conducting policy in order to address a specific problem, in particular a fear of 
deflation as had occurred in Japan in the 1990s.  
 
1.2 The Counterfactual: No Boom, No Bust 
In presenting this chart to the central bankers meeting in Jackson Hole in August 2007 I 
argued that this extra easy policy was responsible for accelerating the housing boom and thereby 
ultimately leading to the housing bust.  To support such an argument empirically I provided 
statistical evidence that the interest rate deviation shown in Figure 1 could plausibly bring about 
a housing boom.   I did this by using regression techniques to estimate a model of the empirical 
relationship between the interest rate and housing starts, and I then simulated that model to see 
what would have happened in the counterfactual event that policy had followed the rule shown in 
Figure 1. In this way an empirical proof was provided that monetary policy was a key cause of 
the boom and hence the bust and the crisis.  
  Figure 2 summarizes the results of this empirical approach. It is a picture of housing 
starts in the United States during the same period as Figure 1; it is drawn from that same 2007 
Jackson Hole paper [1].  The jagged line shows actual housing starts in thousands of units. Both 




Figure 2. The Boom-Bust in Housing Starts Compared 
With the Counterfactual. (The line with shorter dashes  
shows model simulations with the actual interest rate.) 
 
The line labeled “counterfactual” in Figure 2 is what a statistically estimated model of housing 
starts suggests would have happened had interest rates followed along the rule in Figure 1; 
clearly there would have not been such a big housing boom and bust.  Hence, Figure 2 provides 
empirical evidence that the unusually low interest rate policy was a factor in the housing boom.  
One can challenge this conclusion, of course, by challenging the model, but an advantage of 
using a model and an empirical counterfactual is that one has a formal framework for debating 
the issue.  
  Not shown in Figure 2 is the associated boom and bust in housing prices in the United 
States.  The boom-bust was evident throughout most of the country, but was worse in California, 
Florida, Arizona and Nevada. The only exceptions were in states like Texas and Michigan where 
local factors offset the monetary excess stressed here.  
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Though the housing boom was the most noticeable effect of the monetary excesses, they 
also could be seen in more gradually rising overall prices: CPI inflation, for example, averaged 
3.2 percent at an annual rate during the past five years, well above the 2 percent target suggested 
by many policy makers and implicit in the policy rule in Figure 1.  It is always difficult to predict 
the exact initial impacts of monetary shocks, but housing was also a volatile part of GDP in the 
1970s another period of monetary instability before the onset of the Great Moderation. The 
monetary policy followed during the Great Moderation had the advantages of keeping both the 
overall economy stable and the inflation rate low.  
 
1.3 Competing Explanations: A Global Saving Glut 
Some argue that the low interest rates in 2002-2004 were caused by global factors beyond 
the control of the monetary authorities.  If so, then the interest rate decisions by the monetary 
authorities were not the major factor causing the boom. This explanation is potentially appealing 
because long term interest rates remained low for a while even after the short-term federal funds 
rate started increasing.  This alternative explanation focuses on global saving. It argues that there 
was an excess of world saving—a global saving glut—which pushed interest rates down in the 
United States and other countries.  
The main problem with this explanation is that there is actually no evidence for a global 
saving glut.  On the contrary, as Figure 3 shows in very simple terms, there seems to be a saving 
shortage. This figure, which was produced by staff at the International Monetary Fund in 2005, 
shows that the global saving rate—world saving as a fraction of world GDP—was very low in 
the 2002-2004 period especially when compared with the 1970s and 1980s. So this alternative 




Figure 3. Global Saving and Investment as a Share of World GDP 
Source: World Economic Outlook, IMF Sept 2005, Chapter 2, p. 92,  
  
           To be sure, there was a gap of saving over investment in the world outside the United 
States during 2002-2004, and this may be the source of the term “saving glut.” But the United 
States was saving less than it was investing during this period; it was running a current account 
deficit which implies that saving was less then investment.  Thus the positive saving gap outside 
the United States was offset by an equal sized negative saving gap in the United States.  No extra 
impact on world interest rates would be expected.  As implied by simple global accounting, there 
is no global gap between saving and investment.   
 
1.4 Monetary Policy in Other Countries: Central Banks Looking at Each Other? 
Nevertheless there are possible global connections to keep track of when assessing the 
root cause of the crisis.  Most important is the evidence that interest rates at several other central 
banks also deviated from what historical regularities, as described by a Taylor rule, would 
predict.  Even more striking is that housing booms were largest where the deviations from the  
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rule were largest.
3  For example, within Europe the deviations from the Taylor rule vary in size 
because inflation and output data vary from country to country.  The country with the largest 
deviation from the rule was Spain, and it had the biggest housing boom, measured by the change 
in housing investment as a share of GDP. The country with the smallest deviation was Austria; it 
had the smallest change in housing investment as a share of GDP.  The very close correlation is 
shown in Figure 4 which plots the sum of deviations from the policy rule on the horizontal axis 
and the change in housing investment as a share of GDP on the vertical axis. 
  
 
Figure 4. Housing Investment Versus Deviations From the  
Taylor Rule in Europe (Source: See footnote 3.)    
 
An important question, with implications for reform of the international financial system, is 
whether these low interest rates at other central banks were influenced by the decisions in the 
                                                 
3 R. Ahrend, B. Cournède and R. Price provide a fascinating analysis of the experiences in OECD countries during 
this period in their paper "Monetary Policy, Market Excesses and Financial Turmoil", OECD Economics 
Department Working Papers, No. 597, March 2008. They show that the deviations from the Taylor rule explain a 
large fraction of the cross-country variation in housing booms in OECD countries.   
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United States or represented an interaction among central banks that caused global short interest 
rates to be lower than they otherwise would have been.  To test this hypothesis, I examined the 
decisions at the European Central Bank in a paper [2] for a talk in Europe in June 2007.  I 
studied the deviations (or the residuals) of the ECB interest rate decisions from the same type of 
policy rule used in Figure 1, but using Euro zone inflation and GDP data.  The interest rate set by 
the ECB was also below the rule; in other words there were negative residuals. To determine 
whether those residuals were influenced by the Federal Reserve’s interest rate decisions, I ran a 
regression of them during 2000-2006 on the federal funds rate shown in Figure1.  I found that the 
estimated coefficient was .21 and that it was statistically significant. 
  Figure 5 gives a visual sense of how much of the ECB interest rate decisions could be 
explained by the influence of the Fed’s interest rate decisions. It appears that a good fraction can 
be explained in this way.  The jagged looking line in Figure 5 shows the deviations of the actual 
interest rates set by the ECB from the policy rule. (I have not smoothed out the high frequency 
jagged movements as in Figure 1).  By this measure, the ECB interest rate was as much as two 
percentage points too low during this period. The smoother looking line shows that a good 
fraction of the deviation can be “explained” by the federal funds rate in the United States. 
The reasons for this connection are not clear from this statistical analysis, and are a 
fruitful subject for future research in my view. Indeed it is difficult to distinguish statistically 
between the ECB following the Fed and the Fed following the ECB; similar regressions show 
that there is connection the other way as well. Concerns about the exchange rate, or the influence 
of the exchange rate on inflation, could generate such a relationship. So could third factors such 
as changes in the global real interest rate. 




     Figure 5. Actual Deviations from a Euro Policy Rule and  
     the Predicted (fitted) Values Based on the Federal Funds Rate  
 
   
1.5 Monetary Interaction with the Subprime Mortgage Problem 
A sharp boom and bust in the housing markets would be expected to have had impacts on 
the financial markets as falling house prices lead to delinquencies and foreclosures.  These 
effects were amplified by several complicating factors including the use of sub-prime mortgages, 
especially the adjustable rate variety which led to excessive risk taking.  In the United States this 
was encouraged by government programs designed to promote home ownership, a worthwhile 
goal, but overdone in retrospect. 
It is important to note, however, that the excessive risk taking and the low interest 
monetary policy decisions are connected.  Evidence for this connection is shown in Figure 6 
which plots housing price inflation along with foreclosure and delinquency rates on adjustable 
rate subprime mortgages.  The figure shows the sharp increase in housing price inflation from  
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mid 2003 to early 2006 and the subsequent decline. Observe how delinquency rates and 
foreclosure rates were inversely related to housing price inflation during this period. During the 
years of the rapidly rising housing prices, delinquency and foreclosure rates declined rapidly.  
The benefits of holding onto a house, perhaps working longer hours to make the payments, are 
higher when the price of the house is rising rapidly. When prices are falling, the incentives to do 
so are much less and turn negative if the price of the house falls below the value of the mortgage. 




Figure 6.  Housing Price Inflation and Subprime ARM Delinquencies and Foreclosures   
 
Mortgage underwriting procedures are supposed to take account of the actual realizations 
of foreclosure rates and delinquency rates in cross section data. The procedures would therefore 
have been overly optimistic during the period when prices were rising unless they took account 
of the time series correlation in Figure 6. Thus there is an interaction between the monetary 
excesses and the risk-taking excesses.  It is an illustration of how unintended things can happen  
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when policy deviates from the norm.  In this case, the rapidly rising housing prices and the 
resulting low delinquency rates likely threw the underwriting programs off track and misled 
many people.  
 
1.6 More Complications: Complex Securitization, Fannie, and Freddie 
A significant amplification of these problems occurred because the adjustable-rate sub-
prime and other mortgages were packed into mortgage-backed securities of great complexity.  
The risk of these was underestimated by the rating agencies either because of a lack of 
competition, poor accountability, or most likely an inherent difficulty in assessing risk due to the 
complexity.  It led to what might be called the “Queen of Spades problem” corresponding to the 
game of Hearts.  In the game of Hearts you don't know where the Queen of Spades is; you don't 
want to get stuck with the Queen of Spades.  Well, the Queens of Spades—and there are many of 
them in this game—were the securities with the bad mortgages in them and people didn't know 
where they were. We didn't know which banks were holding them 14 months ago, and we still 
don't know where they are.  This risk in the balance sheets of financial institutions has been at 
the heart of the financial crisis from the beginning.   
In the United States there were other government actions at play here.  The government 
sponsored agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were encouraged to expand and buy mortgage 
backed securities, including those formed with the risky sub-prime mortgages.  While legislation, 
such as the Federal Housing Enterprise Regulatory Reform Act of 2005, was proposed to control 
these excesses, it was not passed into law.  These actions of these agencies should be added to 




2. What Prolonged the Crisis? 
The financial crisis became acute on August 9 and 10, 2007 when the money market 
interest rates rose dramatically. Figure 7 illustrates this using a measure which has since become 
the focus of many studies. The measure is the spread between three-month Libor and the three-
month Overnight Index Swap (OIS).  The OIS is a measure of what the markets expect the 
federal funds rate to be over the three-month period comparable to three month Libor. 
Subtracting OIS from Libor effectively controls for expectations effects which are a factor in all 
term loans, including three-month Libor.  The difference between Libor and OIS is thus due to 
things other than interest rates expectations, such as risk and liquidity effects.  
 
Figure 7.  The Libor–OIS Spread During the First Year of the Crisis 
 
If you look at the lower left of Figure 7 you see a spread of about 10 basis points.  If you 
extended that further to the left, you would see a similarly steady level of about ten basis points. 













12 Sept 2008 
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high ever since. In our research [3] on this episode, John Williams and I called the event “A 
Black Swan in the Money Market,” because it appeared to be so unusual.  Observe that Figure 7 
focuses on the first year of the crisis. The worsening situation in September and October 2008 is 
covered in the next section. 
In addition to being a measure of financial stress, the spread affects the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy to the economy because trillions of dollars of loans and securities 
are indexed to Libor. An increase in the spread, holding the OIS constant, will increase the cost 
of such loans and have a contractionary effect on the economy. Bringing this spread down 
therefore became a major objective of monetary policy, as well as a measure of its success in 
dealing with the market turmoil. 
  
2.1 Diagnosing the Problem: Liquidity or Counterparty Risk? 
Diagnosing the reason for the increased spreads was essential, of course, for determining 
what type of policy response was necessary.  If it was a liquidity problem then providing more 
liquidity by making discount window borrowing easier or opening new windows or facilities 
would be appropriate.  But if the issue was counterparty risk then a direct focus on the quality 
and transparency of the bank’s balance sheets would be appropriate, either by requiring more 
transparency, dealing directly with the increasing number of mortgage defaults as housing prices 
fell, or looking for ways to bring more capital into the banks and other financial institutions.  
In the fall of 2007 John Williams and I embarked on what we thought would be an 
interesting and possibly policy relevant research project [3] to examine the issue.  We 
interviewed traders who deal in the interbank market and we looked for measures of counterparty 
risk.  The idea that counterparty risk was the reason for the increased spreads made sense  
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because it corresponded to the Queen of Spades theory and other reasons for uncertainty about 
banks’ balance sheets. At the time however, many traders and monetary officials thought it was 
mainly a liquidity problem.   
To assess the issue empirically, we looked for measures of risk in these markets to see if 
they were correlated with the spread.  One good measure of risk is the difference between 
interest rates on unsecured and secured interbank loans of the same maturity.  Examples of 
secured loans are government-backed Repos between banks.  By subtracting the interest rate on 
Repos from Libor, you could get a measure of risk. Using regression methods, we then looked 
for the impact of this measure of risk on the Libor spread and showed that it could explain much 
of the variation in the spread.  Other measures of risk gave the same results. 
The results are illustrated in Figure 8 which shows the high correlation between the 
unsecured-secured spread and the Libor-OIS spread.  There seemed to be little role for liquidity. 
These results suggested, therefore, that the market turmoil in the interbank market was not a 
liquidity problem of the kind that could be alleviated simply by central bank liquidity tools. 
Rather it was inherently a counterparty risk issue, which linked back to the underlying cause of 
the financial crisis.  This was not a situation like the Great Depression where just printing money 
or providing liquidity was the solution; rather it was due to fundamental problems in the 
financial sector relating to risk. 
   
  16
  
Figure 8.  Counterparty Risk Explained Most of the Variation  
 
But this was not the diagnosis that drove economic policy during this period.  While it is difficult 
to determine the diagnosis of policy makers because their rationales for the decisions are not 
always explained clearly, it certainly appears that the increased spreads in the money markets 
were seen by the authorities as liquidity problems rather than risk.  Accordingly, their early 
interventions focused mainly on policies other than those which would deal with the fundamental 


















2.2 Three examples 
As evidence I provide three specific examples of the interventions that prolonged the 
crisis either because they did not address the problem or because they had unintended 
consequences. 
 
2.2.1 Term Auction Facility 
To make it easier for banks to borrow from the Fed, the term auction facility (TAF) was 
introduced in December 2007. With this new facility, banks could avoid going to the discount 
window; they could bid directly for funds from the Fed.  Similar facilities were set up 
simultaneously at other central banks. The main aim of the TAF was to reduce the spreads in the 
money markets and thereby increase the flow of credit and lower interest rates. Figure 9, which 
is drawn from my paper with John Williams, shows the amount of funds taken up (on the right 
scale) along with Libor and OIS spread (on the left scale).  Recall that this chart does not go 
beyond mid September 2008.   
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Figure 9.  The Term Auction Facility Had Little Impact on the Spread 
 
Soon after the introduction of the TAF in December 2007, the spread came down a bit 
and some policy makers suggested that it was working. But soon the spread rose again, and if 
you look at Figure 9, it is hard to see any effect on the spread during this whole period.  This 
visual impression is confirmed with detailed regression analysis. The TAF did not seem to make 
much difference. If you think of the reason for the spread as counterparty risk as distinct from 
liquidity, this is not surprising. 
 
2.2.2 Temporary Cash Infusions 
Another early policy response was the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 passed in 













Jan 07 Apr 07 Jul 07 Oct 07 Jan 08 Apr 08 Jul 08
3-Month LIBOR OIS Spread
Fed TAF Balance
Total TAF Balance
Percent Billions of $ 
  19
individuals and families in the United States so they would have more to spend and thus jump-
start consumption and the economy.  Most of the checks were sent in May, June, and July. While 
not a purely monetary action because the rebate was financed by borrowing rather than money 
creation, like the liquidity facilities it was not focused on the underlying causes of the crisis.  
Moreover, as would be predicted by the permanent income theory of consumption, 
people spent little if anything of the temporary rebate, and consumption was not jump-started as 
had been hoped. The evidence is in Figure 10, which is drawn from research reported in [4]. The 
top line shows how personal disposable income jumped at the time of the rebate. The lower line 
shows that personal consumption expenditures did not increase in a noticeable way.  As with the 
earlier charts, formal statistical work shows that the rebates had no statistically significant 
increase in consumption. 
 
 
Figure 10.  The Rebates Increased Income, But Not Consumption. 
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2.2.3 The Initial Cuts in Interest Rates through April 2008 
A third policy response to the financial crisis was the sharp reduction in the federal funds 
rate in the first half year of the crisis. The federal funds rate target went from 5-1/4 percent when 
the crisis began in August 2007 to 2 percent in April 2008. The Taylor rule also called for a 
reduction in the interest rate during this early period, but not as sharp.  Thus the reduction was 
more than would be called for using the historical relation stressed at the start of this paper, even 
adjusting for the Libor-OIS spread as I suggested [5] in a speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
San Francisco and in testimony at the House Financial Services Committee in February.   
It is difficult to assess the full impact of this extra sharp easing, and more research is 
needed.  The lower interest rates reduced the size of the re-set of adjustable rate mortgages and 
thereby was addressed to some of the fundamentals causing the crisis.  Some of these effects 
would have occurred if the interest rate cuts were less aggressive.  
The most noticeable effects at the time of the cut in the federal funds rate, however, were 
the sharp depreciation of the dollar and the very large rise in oil prices.  During the first year of 
the financial crisis oil prices doubled from about $70 per barrel in August 2007 to over $140 in 
July 2008, before plummeting back down as expectations of world economic growth declined 
sharply.  Figure 11 shows the close correlation between the federal funds rate and the price of oil 
during this period using monthly average data.   The chart ends before the global slump in 
demand became evident and oil prices fell back. 
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Figure 11.  The Sharp Cut in Interest Rates Was Accompanied by a Rapid Increase 
in Oil Prices Through the First Year of the Crisis. (Last observation is July 2008)  
 
When the federal funds rate was cut, oil prices broke out of the $60-$70 per barrel range 
and then rose rapidly throughout the first year of the financial crisis. Clearly this bout of high oil 
prices hit the economy hard as gasoline prices skyrocketed and automobile sales plummeted in 
the spring and summer of 2008.  In my view, expressed in a paper [6] delivered at the Bank of 
Japan in May, this interest rate cut helped raise oil and other commodity prices and thereby 
prolonged the crisis.  
Econometric evidence of the connection between interest rates and oil prices is found in 
existing empirical studies.  For example, in early May 2008, the First Deputy Managing Director 
of the International Monetary Fund John Lipsky said: “Preliminary evidence suggests that low 
interest rates have a statistically significant impact on commodity prices, above and beyond the 
typical effect of increased demand. Exchange rate shifts also appear to influence commodity 
prices. For example, IMF estimates suggest that if the US dollar had remained at its 2002 peak  
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through end-2007, oil prices would have been $25 a barrel lower and non-fuel commodity prices 
12 percent lower.”
4   
When it became clear in the fall of 2008 that the world economy was turning down 
sharply, oil prices then returned to the $60-$70 range. But by this time the damage of the high oil 
prices had been done. 
 
3. Why Did the Crisis Worsen So Dramatically More Than a Year After It Began? 
Figure 12 shows, using the same Libor-OIS measure of tension in the financial markets 
as in Figure 7, how dramatically the financial crisis worsened in October 2008. Recall that in our 
research paper on the subject, John Williams and I called the jump in spreads in August 2007 “A 
Black Swan in the Money Market.”  The October 2008 events were even more unusual. Not only 
was the crisis prolonged for more than a year, it worsened, according to this measure, by a factor 
of four. It became a serious credit crunch with large spillovers, seriously weakening an economy 
already suffering from the lingering impacts of the oil price bout and the housing bust. Notice the 
close correlation between our measure of counterparty risk and the Libor-OIS spread, which 
demonstrates convincingly that all along the problems in the market were related to risk rather 
than liquidity.  
  
                                                 
4 See John P. Lipsky, “Commodity Prices and Global Inflation,” Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, 





Figure 12.  Evidence of the Crisis Worsening Dramatically  
Fourteen Months after It Began 
 
 
3.1 An Event Study 
Many commentators have argued that the reason for the worsening of the crisis was the 
decision by the U.S. government (more specifically the Treasury and the Federal Reserve) not to 
intervene to prevent the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers over the weekend of September 13 and 
14. It is difficult to bring rigorous empirical analysis to this important question, but it is 
important that researchers do so because future policy actions depend on the answer.  Perhaps the 
best empirical analyses we can hope for at this time are “event studies” that look carefully at 
reactions in the financial markets to various decisions and events.  Such an event study, 
summarized below, suggests that the answer is more complicated than the decision not to 
intervene to prevent the Lehman bankruptcy and, in my view, lies elsewhere.  
Figure 13 focuses on a few key events from September 1 through mid October—the last 
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place—including implementation of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), guarantees by 
the FDIC, Federal Reserve support for the commercial paper market, similar actions in other 
countries—and conditions have improved somewhat as seen in the graph.  But the question here 
is what led to the worsened conditions, which have so severely affected the economy and 




Figure 13. Event Study of the Dramatic Worsening of the Crisis 
 
Recall that for the year previous to the events in Figure 13, the spread had been 
fluctuating in the 50 to 100 basis point range which was where it was through the first half of 
September 2008.   You can see that the spread moved a bit on September 15th, which is the 
Monday after the weekend decisions not to intervene in Lehman Brothers.  It then bounced back  
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down a little bit on September 16 around the time of the AIG intervention. While the spread did 
rise during the week following the Lehman Brothers decision, it was not far out of line with the 
events of the previous year.  
On Friday of that week the Treasury announced that it was going to propose a large 
rescue package, though the size and details weren't there yet.  Over the weekend the package was 
put together and on Tuesday September 23, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke and 
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson testified at the Senate Banking Committee about the TARP, 
saying that it would be $700 billion in size. They provided a 2-1/2 page draft of legislation with 
no mention of oversight and few restrictions on the use.  They were questioned intensely in this 
testimony and the reaction was quite negative, judging by the large volume of critical mail 
received by many members of the United States Congress.  As shown in Figure 13 it was 
following this testimony that one really begins to see the crises deepening, as measured by the 
relentless upward movement in Libor-OIS spread for the next three weeks.  Things steadily 
deteriorated and the spread went through the roof to 3.5 per cent. 
 
3.2 The Lack of a Predictable Framework for Intervention 
The main message of Figure 13 is that identifying the decisions over the weekend of Sept 
13 and 14 as the cause of the increased severity of the crisis is questionable.  It was not until 
more than a week later that conditions deteriorated.  Moreover, it is plausible that events around 
September 23 actually drove the market, including the realization by the public that the 
intervention plan had not been fully thought through and that conditions were much worse than 
many had been led to believe.  At a minimum a great deal of uncertainty about what the 
government would do to aid financial institutions, and under what circumstances, was revealed  
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and thereby added to business and investment decisions at that time. Such uncertainty would 
have driven up risk spreads in the interbank market and elsewhere. Some evidence of the 
uncertainty is found in a survey taken later (November 5) by the Securities Industry and 
Financial Markets Association (SIFMA); it showed that 94 percent of securities firms and banks 
found that the TARP lacked clarity about its operations. 
The problem of uncertainty about the procedures or criteria for government intervention 
to prevent financial institutions from failing had existed since the time of the Bear Stearns 
intervention in March.  The implication of that decision for future interventions was not made 
clear by policymakers. This lack of predictability about Treasury-Fed intervention policy and 
recognition of the harm it could do to markets likely increased in the fall of 2008 when the 
underlying uncertainty was revealed for all to see. What was the rational for intervening with 
Bear Stearns, and then not with Lehman, and then again with AIG?  What would guide the 
operations of the TARP?  
Worries about the lack of clarity were raised in many quarters.  At a conference on The 
Future Role of Central Banking: The Urgent and Precedent-Setting Next Steps held on the 
Stanford campus in July to address the new interventions, I argued [7] that the U.S. Treasury and 
the Fed urgently needed to develop a new framework for exceptional access to government 
support for financial institutions. I made analogies to a reform put in place at the IMF in 2003 
which clarified the circumstances under which the IMF would provide loans to countries 
experiencing crises.  After these IMF reforms were put in place, the eight year emerging market 
crisis period that had begun in 1995 came to a close.   
Analogously, a new exceptional access framework would describe the process that the 
U.S. and other governments would take when intervening and providing loans to an institution.   
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It would work like the IMF’s exceptional access framework (EAF) which indicated the 
procedures the IMF should take when providing loans to a country. The more policy-makers 
could articulate the rationale and the procedures the better.  
   
Conclusion   
In this paper I have provided empirical evidence that government actions and 
interventions caused, prolonged, and worsened the financial crisis. They caused it by deviating 
from historical precedents and principles for setting interest rates, which had worked well for 20 
years. They prolonged it by misdiagnosing the problems in the bank credit markets and thereby 
responding inappropriately by focusing on liquidity rather than risk. They made it worse by 
providing support for certain financial institutions and their creditors but not others in an ad hoc 
way without a clear and understandable framework.  While other factors were certainly at play, 
these government actions should be first on the list of answers to the question of what went 
wrong.  
 What are the implications of this analysis for the future?  Most urgently it is important to 
reinstate or establish a set of principles to follow to prevent misguided actions and interventions 
in the future.  Though policy is now in a massive clean-up mode, setting a path to get back to 
these principles now can be part of the clean-up, including 
  Returning to the set of principles for setting interest rates that worked well during the 
Great Moderation.    
  Basing any future government interventions on a clearly stated diagnosis of the problem 
and a rationale for the interventions.   
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  Creating a predictable exceptional access framework for providing financial assistance to 
existing financial institutions. The example of how the International Monetary Fund set 
up an exceptional access framework to guide its lending decisions to emerging market 
countries is a good one to follow.  
Some of these reforms require a rethinking of the international financial architecture and others 
are purely domestic. For example, to keep policy interest rates on track in a globalized economy 
it would help to introduce the notion of a global inflation target [3]. This would help prevent 
rapid cuts in interest rates in one country if they perversely affect decisions in other countries. 
Policy makers could then discuss global goals for inflation and the impact that one central bank 
might have on global inflation.  In contrast, developing exceptional access frameworks for 
central banks and finance ministries could be done in each country without a global structure.  
Similarly setting controls on leveraging at the financial institutions could be done in each 
country.   
Finally I want to stress that the research presented in this paper must be considered 
preliminary. We are still in the middle of the crisis and more data need to be collected and 
analyzed. There are and will continue to be differences of opinion.  Carefully documented 
empirical research is needed for sorting out these differences.  We should be basing our policy 
evaluations and conclusions on empirical analyses not ideological, personal, political, or partisan 
grounds.  
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Summary of Empirical Research Projects 
The empirical research projects that I integrated and summarized for this paper are found below. 
[1] “Housing and Monetary Policy,” in Housing, Housing Finance, and Monetary Policy Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City. This paper reported on research completed in the summer of 2007 
before the August flare up in the financial markets.  It focuses on the relationship between 
monetary policy and the housing boom. It was delivered at a policy panel at the annual Jackson 
Hole conference, August 30 - September 1, 2007.   
[2] “Globalization and Monetary Policy: Missions Impossible,” in Mark Gertler and Jordi Gali 
(Eds.) The International Dimensions of Monetary Policy, National Bureau of Economic 
Research. This paper summarized research on globalization and monetary policy pointing to the 
potential problem caused by central banks following each other either directly or indirectly. This 
provided on explanation for why several central banks held interest rates too low in the 2002-
2004 period.  The paper was prepared for a talk at an NBER conference in Girona, Spain on June 
11, 2007.   
[3] “A Black Swan in the Money Market,” with John C. Williams, American Economic Journal 
Macroeconomics, January 2009.  This is the final revision of research we started in the fall of 
2007 on whether the unusual jump in interbank lending rates in August 2007 was caused by 
liquidity problems or counterparty risk. A working paper (No. 2008-04) with the same title was 
issued by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco in April and another working paper, 
“Further Results on a Black Swan in the Money Market” was issued in May by the Stanford 
Institute for Economic Policy Research.  
[4] “The State of the Economy and Principles for Fiscal Stimulus,” Testimony before the Senate 
Budget Committee, November 19, 2008.  This testimony reports on a project to estimate the  
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impact of the tax rebates of 2008 on the economy, with more formal econometric evidence in a 
paper prepared for the American Economic Association meeting in San Francisco, January 2009 
[5] “The Costs and Benefits of Deviating from the Systematic Component of Monetary Policy,” 
keynote address at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco conference on Monetary Policy 
and Asset Markets, February 22, 2008 and “Monetary Policy and the State of the Economy,” 
testimony before the House Financial Services Committee, February 26, 2008. These items 
examined whether monetary policy rules should be adjusted for the increased spread in the 
money markets. 
[6] “The Way Back to Stability and Growth in the Global Economy,” Institute for Monetary and 
Economic Studies, Discussion Paper 2008-E-14, was presented as the inaugural Mayekawa 
lecture at the Bank of Japan in May 2008.  It discussed the impact of the sharp monetary easing 
on oil and other commodity prices and proposed the idea of a global inflation target as a means 
of preventing central banks’ interest rate decisions to spread to other central banks. 
[7] “Toward a New Framework for Exceptional Access,” is a presentation for the policy 
workshop on The Future Role of Central Banking Policy: Urgent and Precedent-Setting Next 
Steps, held at Stanford University on July 22, 2008. This presentation laid out the case for 
developing a more systematic approach to Fed’s interventions and bailouts of financial 
institutions or their creditors. It followed the Bear Stearns intervention but was before the 
Lehman bankruptcy.   